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 Abstract 
This paper examines human resource management practices adopted in a group 
of eight case study firms and their tendencies towards versus away from 
partnership. The analysis is based on data collected during interviews with 124 
employees (75 in organisations tending towards partnership and 49 in 
organisations tending away from partnership) and senior managers, conducted 
in 1997-1998 for the Job Insecurity and Work Intensification Survey (JIWIS). 
Drawing on the perspectives of senior managers and employees, we examine 
the tendency of firms towards and away from partnership in employment 
relations; and in keeping with the JIWIS methodology (Burchell et.al., 2001) we 
combine quantitative and qualitative evidence in our analysis. Specifically, we 
are interested in what partnership looks like in these different contexts, the 
reasons it is pursued (or not), the degree to which companies have been 
successful in achieving their partnership objectives (from the perspective of 
both management and employees), and the conditions that have either facilitated 
or impeded partnership in relationships with employees.   
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 Partnership in Practice 
 
1. Introduction 
Throughout the 1990s, in the face of privatisation, concentration and 
globalisation, British organisations in both the private and public 
sectors have experienced rapid technological change and 
intensifying competition. Customers have learned to exercise their 
‘choice’ more aggressively and shareholders (both private and 
public) have become increasingly impatient for a quick and 
profitable return on their investments. In response to these pressures, 
firms have been forced to re-examine their organisational systems 
and structures in an effort to improve performance as well as their 
ability to respond effectively to these mounting pressures from 
competitors, customers and shareholders. In this context, systems of 
work organisation have been an important focus and the notion of 
‘partnership’ has figured prominently in the debate. 
 
Cooperation and conflict in production relations 
There is no question about the advantage of co-operation or 
‘partnership’ in production. It allows for the full exploitation of the 
technical complementarities inherent to production and facilitates 
the sharing of knowledge necessary for the effectiveness of 
productive systems and their improvement.1 It also fuels the 
organisational learning processes by which new information and 
knowledge are created, incorporated and diffused, and by which 
new products, processes and organisational forms are developed 
(O’Sullivan 1998; Lazonick 1991). The resulting operational and 
dynamic efficiencies are crucial determinants of the ability of 
organisations to compete effectively, and to respond flexibly to 
changing circumstances and new opportunities. These efficiencies 
are also important because they generate the value added by the 
productive system, which forms the basis for the income and 
employment security of its various stakeholder groups. 
 
But it does not follow from the centrality of co-operation in 
production that organisations are necessarily unitary. However 
mutual the interests of workers and the organisation that employs 
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 them may be in production, there is an inevitable competition over 
the distribution of proceeds from that co-operation among the 
various stakeholder groups because what one group receives, the 
others cannot have. This competition extends beyond the 
workplace to include pressures from other claimants: for example, 
the pressure exerted on companies to regularly report increases in 
earnings to the stock market; the pressure of customers on 
suppliers to keep prices down and of suppliers on customers to 
keep them up, the pressure from consumer groups on public 
services regulators to cut prices; or, for that matter, the political 
pressure exerted on behalf of taxpayers, determining the money 
available to pay for the public sector services taxpayers demand. 
These hagglings, with their potentially negative-sum consequences 
for employees, shape the environment within which decisions are 
made regarding whether or not to co-operate or to form 
partnerships in employment relations.  
 
These pressures from other claimants are justified by liberal 
economics on the grounds of the superiority of individual choice in 
free markets for maximising economic welfare. The pivotal role 
assigned to market forces for the effective co-ordination of 
production and consumption has been handed down from Adam 
Smith to modern neo-classical economists. Markets based on the 
freedom of contract provide information and price incentives, 
ensure contractual compliance (by providing opportunities for 
buyers and sellers to readily switch trading partners from among a 
large number of equally well-qualified alternatives) and determine 
distribution.  
 
To ensure markets work effectively, regulation is needed to 
prevent collective and individual monopolies from operating in 
restraint of trade. In particular, such collectives as trade unions, 
employers’ organisations and trade associations are condemned. 
Whatever benefits they claim to provide (i.e., in the way of 
services to their members, guarantees on the quality of services 
and mechanisms for countering unequal bargaining power) they 
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 are ruled as being fundamentally against the public interest and 
therefore in need of close regulation.  
 
Liberal economics is, however, more ambiguous about the effect 
of dominant firms and their power to monopolise and reduce 
economic welfare. Nevertheless, the market offers opportunities 
for more efficient forms of organisation to succeed; and this may 
result in, or even require, a degree of market control. Large 
businesses evolve, it has been argued, because of their superior 
managerial and production organisation which gives them market 
advantage (Chandler 1978) or because of their ability to discover 
new profit opportunities in a world of uncertainty (Kirzner 1997). 
To a certain degree, monopoly is also seen as encouraging 
technical change by allowing the innovator to secure sufficient 
profits to encourage investment in new products and processes 
(Schumpeter 1943). Managerial command provides another  
alternative to the market when contracts are difficult and costly to 
enforce (Williamson, 1987). The right of corporations to expand 
through acquisition of others by means of hostile takeovers is 
justified on the grounds that the stock market operates as an 
efficient market for managerial control; it is assumed to provide 
share holders the opportunity to discipline inefficient or 
malfeasant managers by selling their shares to others promising a 
higher rate of return. In each of these cases, market competition is 
seen as a creative process by which efficient forms of organisation 
are promoted and inefficient forms are superseded. From this 
perspective, large size may be the reward of success; however 
large firms can only survive if they generate the operational and 
dynamic efficiencies necessary for keeping on their feet in the face 
of the market driven “gale of creative destruction” (Schumpeter 
1943).  
 
It is, however, recognised that there are downsides to the 
concentration of economic power. Its abuse in labour and product 
markets has significant distributional effects. Controlling 
managers might act against shareholder interests; and the social 
and natural environment might be threatened. Regulation is 
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 therefore accepted as necessary to counter such negative 
externalities2 and to contain the destructive capabilities of 
competition. But, caution economists, the urge to regulate must be 
tempered by the recognition that in the final analysis the market 
provides the best opportunities and outcomes for both individuals 
and society. Whilst the market concentrates economic power, it 
also yields important benefits in the form of technical progress and 
economic growth.  What is good for big business is assumed to 
also be good for society, and although their excesses require 
checking, it would check progress to unduly restrict their market 
opportunities.  
 
The central message of liberal economics is that of the superiority 
of the market for stimulating, co-ordinating and regulating 
production in the general interest. In his book, The Fatal Conceit: 
The Errors of Socialism, Hayek argued that individualisation and 
the ordering principle of the market, the hallmark of capitalism, 
evolved to supersede direct co-operation within groups, which he 
identified as an instinctual primitive trait (1988, Chapter 1). But 
what Hayek failed to evolve (a weakness shares with other liberal 
economists) was a theory of production and especially one of work 
organisation. This was left to management theorists. 
 
Theories of work organisation 
Theories of work organisation developed from the 19th Century 
vision of the need for arbitrary and harsh management to enforce 
labour contracts in the workplace. The first stage in this 
development was the emergence of scientific management based 
on engineering principles. The proponents of scientific 
management claimed to have discovered scientific laws based on 
engineering principles to guide the hand of management in 
organising production, allocating tasks and creating incentives to 
maximise production. They retained the idea of economic man.  
But they believed that the laws of production they had discovered, 
if properly administered by management, would act as impartial 
arbitrators between the conflicting interests within the firm in 
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 much the same way that the laws of the market do outside the 
firm.  
 
The failure of scientific management to fully deliver improved 
performance and to resolve management worker conflict led to a 
greater interest in management practice that would enhance the 
physical and psychological well-being of the workforce. In the 
development of the human relations approach, psychological and 
sociological theories were used to challenge the idea of economic 
man and to replace it with that of social man. Initially, the aim of 
human relations was to identify the physiological and social needs 
of workers. This knowledge would then be used to modify existing 
selection, training and work design processes as well as to make 
hierarchical management more compatible with the socio-
psychological needs of workers. This essentially remedial role for 
human relations was later overtaken by research which showed 
that it had a more proactive role to play. What was discovered was 
that there are increasing returns to greater worker involvement in 
the planning and execution of work, as well as to work group 
activities, worker self regulation, closer involvement with 
management and a more democratic style of management.   
 
Modern human resource management has integrated scientific 
management with the human relations approach. This evolution 
has been accompanied by a redefinition of the employing 
organisation from pluralist to unitary and of the role of labour 
management from authoritarian, however benevolent, to facilitator 
of a participatory, cooperative and self-regulating system. In the 
process, the worker has been transformed from a factor of 
production in need of dragooning into compliance with contractual 
promise to a full partner in co-operative production provided his or 
her psychological needs are fully met. What the human relations 
school discovered was that the primitive traits, identified by 
Hayek as a hindrance to the development of markets, were actually 
essential for production.  
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 It is important to note the opposing tendencies of liberal economic 
and labour management theory. Whereas the former lent 
theoretical justification to the concentration of control over 
production, the latter provided theoretical support for the 
decentralisation of responsibility for production. However, the two 
schools agree that trade unions and collective bargaining are 
unnecessary.  Liberal economics retains its faith in the market as 
the arbiter for distributional shares whilst in labour management 
theory, the threat of conflict inherent in distributional bargaining 
poses a threat to the co-operation needed for production.    
 
Although they recognise the sociological and psychological needs 
of workers, and the importance of worker self-regulation and 
involvement in management as mechanisms for securing full-co-
operation, the proponents of human resource management and its 
pre-cursors have been no more sympathetic to workers’ 
independent representation than liberal economists or the scientific 
management school. The early case for human relations was that 
the diagnosis and effective treatment of socio-psychological 
problems would improve the well-being of group members, the 
cohesiveness of the group and therefore its productive 
performance. From this standpoint, conflict was considered 
dysfunctional. Elton Mayo, of Hawthorne fame, believed that: 
 
‘Conflict was neither inevitable nor economic. It was 
the result of the maladjustment of a few men on the 
labour side of industry. Even after Hawthorne forced 
Mayo to grow, he remained firm in his conviction that 
conflict was an evil, a symptom of the lack of social 
skills. Cooperation, for him, was symptomatic of 
health; and, since their was no alternative in the 
modern world, cooperation must mean obedience to 
managerial authority. Thus collective bargaining was 
not really cooperation, but merely a flimsy substitute 
for the real thing.’ (Baritz 1975, pp332-333). 
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 Social scientists have also argued that wage demands mask ‘more 
real and human needs for appreciation, understanding and 
friendliness;’ and they have gone further by identifying the need to 
join trade unions as a symptom of low intellect and psychological 
disorders (Baritz 1975, p332).  
 
Co-operation and competitiveness:  From hierarchical 
management to industrial partnership  
The major challenge to traditional forms of work organisation in 
Britain came not from internal reforms, but rather, from the 
demonstrated competitive superiority of more co-operative forms of 
industrial organisation, largely by foreign producers. This new 
competition is broadly based on higher quality, improved design, 
greater variety more rapid product and process innovation and lower 
costs (Best 1990). It was launched by Japanese, German, Italian, 
Swedish and other producers who had evolved co-operative 
employment relations and relational contracting arrangements with 
their suppliers and customers.3 The effect was the generation of high 
levels of operational and dynamic efficiency, largely as a 
consequence of mobilising and improving worker and supplier 
commitment, skills and knowledge. High levels of competitive 
performance rest on the recognition of the mutuality of interests and 
the ability to maximise these by building high-trust, partnership 
relationships.4 Such co-operative arrangements are supported by 
the state, trade associations, trade unions, and other organisations 
and institutions which intervene by setting norms, rules and 
standards for regulating market and other relations between the 
social partners.  
 
In response to increasing competitive pressures and difficulties, in 
1979, the Conservative government focused on the perceived need 
to restore to management the right to manage within the traditional 
system of IR. Worker organisation was weakened by 
unemployment and by anti-trade union legislation. However, the 
failure of this strategy to stem the decline in UK competitiveness 
helps to explain why, especially during the 1990s, more and more 
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 companies have been re-assessing their HRM strategies and 
turning to more co-operative forms of work organisation.  
 
Following this trend, the ‘New’ Labour Government, elected in 
1997, endorsed labour-management co-operation and ‘partnership’ 
as an effective approach for improving economic performance. In 
interpreting the Government’s position, Wood (2000) identified 
the requirements of the new system as:  
‘one of partnership at work … associated with the kind of 
model of HRM … focused on the achievement of a particular 
role orientation on the part of employees so that they are 
flexible, expansive in their perceptions and willing 
contributors to innovation.’ (Wood 2000, p. 130). 
 
He went on to suggest that  
‘Partnership is a matter of employers having the right to ask 
employees to develop themselves in order to accept fresh 
responsibilities whilst they themselves must take 
responsibility for providing the context in which this can 
happen’  
 
In this formulation of partnership, the strong emphasis is on the 
need for workers to make largely unconditional commitments to 
their employer’s business interests and objectives, and to mould 
themselves to its needs. In this way, workers provide additional 
and improved resources for the firm’s managers to manage more 
effectively.  
 
This position was neatly summed up by Tony Blair, the New 
Labour Prime Minister, when he laid out the Labour government’s 
primary industrial relations objectives.5 They required, he argued, 
‘nothing less than to change the culture of relations in and at 
work’. He stressed the need for the new culture to be ‘one of 
voluntary understanding and co-operation because it has been 
recognised that the prosperity of each (employer and employee) is 
bound up in the prosperity of all;’ and he emphasised that 
‘partnership works best when it is about real goals – part of a 
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 strategy for instance for doubling business. Or bringing employee 
relations in line with market re-positioning. Or ending the often-
meaningless ritual of annual wage squabbling.’ It should be 
carefully noted that Blair made no reference to the ritual of the 
continuous squabble over the distribution of dividends between 
managers or shareholders or to the constant insistence on better 
terms for consumers which the Government orchestrates. Rather, 
what Blair clearly had in mind was the need for workers to bow to 
the needs of business by meeting both its production and 
distributional requirements. 
 
As might be expected, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), although 
committed to New Labour and to industrial partnership, took a less 
bipartisan view of workers’ position with respect to co-operative 
work systems. In its May 1999 Partners for Progress – New 
Unionism at the Workplace, 6 the TUC advocated enterprise-level 
industrial partnership and identified six underlying principles. 
Four of these emphasised the importance of the commitment by 
both sides of industry to co-operation as a means of improving 
business performance:  
1. a shared commitment to the success of the organisation;  
2. a renewed focus on the quality of working life, giving 
workers access to opportunities to improve their skills, 
focusing attention on improving job content and enriching 
the quality of work;  
3. openness and a willingness to share information;  
4. adding value – unions, workers and employers must see that 
partnership is delivering measurable improvements;  
 
Two of the principles implied that such a commitment by workers 
was not to be thought of as unconditional: 
5. a recognition by both the union and employer that they each 
have different and legitimate interests.’ 
6. a commitment by the employer to employment security in 
return for which the union agrees to a higher level of 
functional flexibility in the work place. 
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2. On the Road to Partnership?  
In this section and the next, we examine more closely the human 
resource management practices adopted by our case study firms 
and their tendencies towards versus away from partnership.  This 
analysis is based on data collected during interviews with 124 
employees (75 in organisations tending towards partnership and 49 
in organisations tending away7 from partnership) and senior 
managers, conducted in 1997-1998 for the Job Insecurity and 
Work Intensification Survey (JIWIS). Drawing on the perspectives 
of senior managers and employees, we examine the tendency of 
firms towards and away from partnership in employment relations; 
and in keeping with the JIWIS methodology (Burchell et.al., 2001) 
we combine quantitative and qualitative evidence in our analysis.  
Specifically, we are interested in what partnership looks like in 
these different contexts, the reasons it is pursued (or not), the 
degree to which companies have been successful in achieving their 
partnership objectives (from the perspective of both management 
and employees), and the conditions that have either facilitated or 
impeded partnership in relationships with employees.   
 
The organisations in our study include two providers of higher 
education services, RegColl and FEColl, each receiving a 
substantial proportion of their funding from a government funding 
agency.  They also include four manufacturing firms (CementCo, 
CableCo, DrinksCo and DairyCo) and two financial services 
companies (InsureCo and BankCo) all of which are publicly 
limited organisations whose shares are quoted on the stock market.  
A brief description of each organisation in provided in Table 1a, 
below; table 1b more explicitly presents the cases as matched 
pairs.  
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Table 1a:  Organisations Participating in the Study 
 
Company Description 
Companies Tending Towards Partnership 
 
RegColl 
A medium sized, independent corporation providing 
educational services to the further education sector. 
RegColl receives a substantial proportion of its finances 
from a government funding agency. 
CementCo A large independent manufacturing company in the 
building materials sector.  CementCo’s shares are quoted 
on the stock market. 
DrinksCo A large manufacturing company in the food and drinks 
sector which is owned by a British corporation. 
DrinksCo is quoted on the stock market. 
InsureCo A large financial services company owned by a British 
corporation.  InsureCo’s shares are quoted on the stock 
market. 
Companies Tending Away From Partnership 
 
FEColl 
A medium sized, independent corporation providing 
educational services to the further education sector. 
FEColl receives a substantial proportion of its funding 
from a government funding agency 
 
CableCo 
A large manufacturer of components for the 
telecommunications and IT markets which is owned by a 
British corporation. CableCo’s shares are quoted on the 
stock market. 
DairyCo A large, independent food manufacturer. DairyCo’s 
shares are traded on the stock market. 
BankCo A large, financial services company owned by a foreign 
corporation. BankCo’s shares are quoted on the stock 
market.  
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Table 1b:  Matched pairs of 
organisations 
 
Towards 
Partnership 
Away from 
Partnership 
RegColl FEColl 
CementCo CableCo 
DrinksCo DairyCo 
InsureCo BankCo 
 
 
In classifying companies as tending towards or away from 
partnership, rather than finding an ideal type of partnership 
relationship, we found different patterns in the conditions that 
fuelled tendencies towards versus away from partnership in 
employment relations. In identifying tendencies, we were 
particularly concerned with examining human resource 
management practices and changes in work organisation / 
involvement, employee responses to these practices, changes in 
the quality of management and trade union leadership and 
representation during the previous five years, the level of support 
for social dialogue, and the existence and parameters of 
employment security agreements. These themes were identified as 
important in the TUC’s six principles and in the internal and 
external conditions for partnership found in Deakin et. al. 2001. 
This is further elaborated in the following sections; the tendencies 
evident in the cases are summarised in Table 2 below. 
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 Table 2:  Tendendies towards and away from partnership 
Tendendies towards and away from partnership 
Some characteristics of the cases 
 
 Towards 
Partnership 
 
DrinksCo, 
CementCo 
InsureCo, RegColl 
 
Away from 
Partnership 
 
DairyCo, 
CableCo, 
BankCo, FEColl
Changes in relations 
between management 
and trade unions in the 
last five years 
A perception of 
improving 
relations  
 
Generally, a 
perception of 
deteriorating 
relations 
Changes in procedural 
support for social 
dialogue and 
information exchange in 
the last five years 
A growth in 
procedural support 
for social dialogue 
 
Generally, a 
decline in 
procedural 
support for 
social dialogue 
Integrative and 
distributive interactions 
Integrative 
interactions 
dominant 
Distributive 
interactions 
more prevalent 
Commitment to 
employment security/ no 
compulsory 
redundancies (CR) 
Employment 
security 
commitments in a 
variety of forms 
 
Employment 
security 
commitments 
less prevalent 
 
Innovations to facilitate 
involvement and flexible 
working 
A variety of innovations generally 
common to the cases 
  
Ability to sustain 
compulsory redundancy 
agreements 
Widespread uncertainty/pessimism 
and a culture of downsizing 
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 We start by examining the pressures to which firms have been 
subject and their responses to those pressures. We then examine 
the nature of partnership and non-partnership tendencies in our 
eight case study firms. Finally, we compare partnership with non-
partnership organisations in terms of their human resource 
practices and employee outcomes.  
 
Pressures from competitors, customers and shareholders 
Irrespective of whether they were tending towards or away from 
partnership, all of the organisations in our survey reported 
intensifying competition in their product markets, translating into 
considerable price pressure. In virtually every case, senior 
managers told us that the market and/or what customers were 
prepared to pay were important in determining their prices. 
Organisations least likely to emphasise the importance of the 
market in determining prices generally had their prices regulated 
by external agents. But as demonstrated by the experience of 
RegColl and FEColl, the two organisations providing educational 
services, external price regulation was no protection from the 
competitive forces operating in the non-regulated industries. Both 
colleges stressed that failure to meet targets set by government 
funding agencies (based on 'units of activity' i.e. students on 
courses) would inevitably result in funding cuts. 
 
In every case, price pressure meant that maintaining profit margins 
depended on containing costs, particularly those costs over which 
firms had most direct control (i.e., labour costs). Thus, instead of 
practicing ‘cost plus pricing’, organisations practiced ‘price minus 
costing’; and in the six cases where shares were quoted on the 
stock market, pressure to deliver share holder value placed 
additional constraints on costs. 
 
In addition to pressures stemming from shareholders and 
competitors, the drive towards organisational responsiveness was 
also heavily influenced by the impatience and variability of 
customer demand. With the exception of the two educational 
organisations, firms were operating at (or near) full capacity. In 
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 this context, the need for organisational responsiveness was 
particularly apparent as customers increasingly demanded 'just-in-
time' delivery of goods and services. Further, when it came to 
scheduling production, senior managers told us that pressure to 
meet the immediate requirements of customers meant that putting 
the customer 'on hold' (via waiting lists or variations in delivery 
times) was not an option. 
 
In addition to customer impatience, organisations were forced to 
contend with considerable variation in customer demands. Our 
evidence suggested the pervasiveness of economic uncertainty, the 
uncertainty due to product demand changes and technical change. 
Only two organisations, both manufacturers (CementCo and 
DairyCo), reported slight (and predictable) variations in the 
demand for their products or services. Three organisations, 
RegColl, InsureCo and BankCo reported that variations in demand 
were moderate and unpredictable. DrinksCo deviated slightly from 
its matched pair DairyCo in telling us that variations in the 
demand for their products or services were substantial but 
predictable; the remaining two (FEColl and CableCo) deviated 
slightly from their sectoral counterparts indicating that they faced 
demand variations that were both substantial and unpredictable. 
 
In the cases of RegColl and FEColl, the unpredictable variations in 
demand were associated with difficulties in forecasting demand 
for particular courses from the wide range on offer and from the 
high levels of competition in the market for further education.  
Senior managers in the financial services sector related the 
unpredictability of demand to the unforecastable nature of 
hurricanes and other disastrous 'Acts of God'. Whilst the 
unpredictable variations in demand for telecommunication and IT 
components produced by CableCo could be linked to the surges 
and subsequent slow-downs in infrastructure installations and the 
intense international competition for such products.  
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 Changing relations with customers and suppliers in response 
to increased pressures 
As noted earlier, all the senior managers in every organisation in 
our study told us that competition for their products and/or 
services had intensified over the past five years. The substantial 
increased pressure coming from customers that they reported in 
describing these changes is shown in Table 3. Dark cells indicate 
that customers were exercising greater control: by securing 
additional credit (e.g. taking longer to pay), exercising more 
control over prices, or insisting on more frequent delivery and 
smaller batch sizes. Diagonal shading indicates no change in the 
relationship while plus signs indicate that changes have been 
favourable to the organisation. It is clear from Table 3 that overall, 
the partnership firms were coming under less increased pressure 
from customers than the non-partnership firms.  Taking a closer 
look at the matched pairs, the most pronounced differences occurs 
between CementCo and CableCo, the latter experiencing increased 
pressure on all sides. 
 
Table 3. Change in Customers Relations and budget 
constraints 
     
 Credit Price Delivery Batch size
Partnership Organisations 
RegColl  +  + 
CementCo   +  
DrinksCo +    
InsureCo     
Non-partnership organisations 
FEColl  +  + 
CableCo     
DairyCo     
BankCo     
 
Not surprisingly, most of the organisations in our survey tried to 
offset some of the effects of increased product market and 
budgetary pressures by passing them on to their suppliers. This is 
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 evident in Table 4, where plus signs indicate a greater degree of 
control over suppliers, dark cells indicate less control and diagonal 
shading suggests that there has been no change. The evidence in 
Table 4 suggests that overall, the partnership firms were more 
successful at passing on pressure to their suppliers than were the 
non-partnership organisations. Again the most pronounced 
matched pairs difference occurs between CementCo and CableCo, 
the latter experiencing an erosion of control over its suppliers. 
DrinksCo also found itself more able to pass on pressure to 
suppliers than DairyCo via its enhanced control over prices. 
 
Table 4. Change in Relations with Suppliers 
     
 Credit Price Delivery Batch size 
Partnership Organisations 
RegColl     
Cement Co  + +  
DrinksCo + + +  
InsureCo  + +  
Non-partnership Organisations 
FEColl     
CableCo     
DairyCo +  +  
BankCo na na na na 
 
 
Nevertheless, although some of the pressure for responsiveness 
could be passed onto suppliers, in every case, most of this pressure 
devolved to the shoulders of the workforce. Moreover, it was the 
'core' workforce which took primary responsibility for ensuring the 
flexible delivery of goods and services. Only 25 percent of 
organisations suggested that the 'buying-in' of labour played an 
important role in their production process. Likewise only 25 
percent of the organisations indicated that the 'putting-out' of 
labour (to meet peaks in demand) was an important element in 
their scheduling provisions. Similarly, most of the other 
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 techniques that relied on adjusting the number of workers to match 
fluctuations in demand, were also eschewed by the organisations 
in our survey. For the majority of firms (87.5 percent and 75 
percent respectively) neither labour hoarding nor dishoarding 
played an important part in their production schedules. Instead, the 
burden of adjusting production to demand tended to be borne by 
their core employees, an imposition that fell on both partnership 
and non-partnership organisations alike. 
 
Partnership versus non-partnership  tendencies 
In the four cases in our study identified as tending towards 
partnership, we found that partnership could be characterised as 
‘pro-active’ (where the objective of partnership was to facilitate 
delivery of a high quality/value product or service to consumers, 
or to jointly find a way forward in the face of market or regulatory 
opportunities or challenges) or ‘reactive’ (where the objective of 
partnership was more likely to be the management of redundancies 
or plant closures). Close up, partnership in practice was somewhat 
more complex than this and we found that the spectrum of 
partnership orientation involved a considerable area of grey (figure 
1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
pro-active  reactive partial pseudo 
InsureCo RegColl CementCo 
DrinksCo 
BankCo
FEColl
CableCo 
DairyCo 
Figure 1: a spectrum of partnership orientations 
 
 
Whether pro-active or reactive our organisations displayed an 
increased orientation to price minus costing, essentially job 
cutting, casting a shadow over organisational change. Table 5 
shows the ubiquitous nature of job cutting and it will be a 
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 pervasive feature of the vignettes of partnership orientation in our 
cases, to which we now turn. 
 
Table 5: Summary of redundancy exercises in the JIWIS 
Survey Partnership and Non partnership organisations 
 
Organisation 
(% fall in 
workforce  
in last 5 years) 
“Redundancy” 
exercises in the 
last five years 
 
Job categories 
affected 
Proportion of 
“redundancies” 
by form 
  VR           CR         VER 
CementCo  
(21percent) 
Partnership 
 
1994 
 
All 
 
25 % 
 
75 % 
 
x 
CableCo 
(45 %) 
Non partnership 
 
1996, 1998 
 
All 
 
15 % 
 
85 % 
 
x 
DrinksCo 
(30 %) 
Partnership 
 
1993/4, 1994-7 
 
All 
 
86 % 
 
14 % 
 
x 
DairyCo 
Non partnership 
 
1995 
Manual workers on 
shop floor in 
bottling plant 
 
100 %* 
 
x 
 
x 
InsureCo 
(10 %) 
Partnership 
 
YES 
Managerial grades 
and clerical staff in 
branch network 
 
100 %* 
 
x 
 
x 
BankCo 
(17 %) 
Non partnership 
 
1993,1994,1995 
1996,1997 
Managerial, 
Clerical staff in 
branch network 
 
70 % 
 
30 % 
 
x 
 
 
RegColl 
Partnership 
 
1996/97 
Part/full-time 
lecturers, 
senior/middle 
managers, 
Technicians and 
caretakers 
 
15 % 
 
85 % 
 
 
Most 
 
FEColl 
Non partnership 
 
1996/97 
 
Part-time lecturers 
 
x 
 
100 % 
 
x 
 
VR - voluntary redundancy;  
CR - compulsory redundancy; 
VER - voluntary early retirement; 
*staff offered relocation to job in another part of the organisation/country. 
 
Nb: extensive redundancies, across all job-types, occurred in all organisations except 
FEColl and Dairy Co where redundancies were compartmentalised to specific job-types. 
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 Proactive partnership tendancies:  CementCo and DrinksCo 
CementCo and DrinksCo came closest to approximating what 
might be described as ‘proactive’ partnership. And as we will see 
shortly, this was very much in contrast to their matched pairs. Both 
companies described themselves as ‘partnership’ organisations; 
and these descriptions were imbued with the language of aspiring 
to develop ‘positive’ and ‘constructive’ employment relationships, 
requiring ‘goodwill’ and ‘high trust’ to effect organisational 
change, a healthy psychological contract. Both companies had 
experienced movement in the direction of ‘greater’ social 
partnership during the last five years and both had made 
substantial efforts to formalise the parameters of that partnership. 
Their approaches resonate with the TUC’s six underlying 
principles of enterprise level partnership, including worker 
commitments that were, ostensibly, conditional.  
 
At both CementCo and DrinksCo, a great deal of emphasis was 
placed on delivering a high quality service to customers and 
benchmarking their performance against world-class 
manufacturers. Their competitive strategy involved working co-
operatively with recognised trade unions and employees, and 
cultivating integrative interactions, rather than distributive 
bargaining. Innovation was not considered to be a management 
prerogative in the sense that both CementCo and DrinksCo 
actively endeavored to develop a culture of continuous 
improvement through involvement and collectivisation of effort. 
Employment security was seen as fundamental to achieving this 
change in culture and to enhance performance standards. 
Employment security agreements in both companies might more 
appropriately be described as partnership agreements. The focus 
on a healthy psychological contract is fundamental to partnership 
because of its importance in helping to secure co-operation at 
work and reducing the (social) uncertainty that can arise because 
of the separation of labour power and labour.  
 
DrinksCo’s partnership agreement.  In 1994 DrinksCo signed a 
three year no compulsory redundancy agreement with the GMB 
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 and TGWU covering manual workers and the agreement was 
subsequently extended to 1999. The key features of the agreement 
were employment security, training and flexibility. Under the 1994 
pay and benefits agreement there was a demand for flexibility in 
skills and attitudes. And there was related investment in multi-
skilling on the shop floor with staff undertaking quality 
checks/problem-solving and moves towards self-managing work 
teams. In exchange for co-operation in a ‘long-term’ pay deal, 
moderating increases, it was emphasised that flexibility might 
mean jobs being cut, and if they were, voluntary redundancies 
would be sought and others would be re-deployed. The agreement 
stressed that  
‘Employment commitment will provide the security in 
which to suggest and initiate changes and improvements 
without being concerned about ending up on the dole 
queue’.     
 
In other words employment security assurances were seen as a key 
to facilitating a high-trust work environment and ‘integrative 
interactions’, providing a context in which workers would 
willingly accept additional responsibilities. Indeed, management 
emphasised that trust and employee fulfillment were the single 
most important motivational factors and that while fear of 
redundancy might enhance performance in the short term, in the 
longer term performance would decline.  The commitment was to 
core workers. The practice of temporary workers becoming 
permanent workers after twelve months’ service was ended to 
increase redeployment opportunities for established employees. 
 
Not only were there changes in the traditional organisation of 
work, social dialogue between the company and unions was seen 
as fundamental to a partnership approach. Procedural structures 
were developed to facilitate communication and consultation. 
DrinksCo already had both national and local level joint 
consultation committees, a European Works Council and Joint 
Negotiating Committee (JNC). A joint working party was set up to 
improve the negotiating process and a shift away from the JNCs 
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 traditional exclusive focus upon pay was reported. And an 
employee development programme for shop stewards and line 
managers was introduced.  Joint training was also developed for 
these groups, who were seen as key lubricants in organisational 
change. In addition there was investment in employee 
representative training. A wider employee development 
programme included a focus on core communications skills and 
assertiveness training.    
 
It has been noted that employers grant trade unions recognition as 
a means of establishing a procedural structure within which a 
power relationship can be mediated. Consultation promoting 
dialogue and information exchange can positively influence that 
relationship enhancing the conditions for goodwill (Brown et.al. 
2001). DrinksCo provides an example of an experiment in using 
targeted training, encouraging ‘in this togetherness’, to influence 
the interaction of union and management leadership in 
consultation and negotiation. Clearly some careful thought was 
given to the internal conditions for partnership. By early 1997, the 
union side was vigorously promoting the benefits of positive 
partnership (See Box 1). 
 
 
Box 1: GMB statement of the Benefits of positive partnership 
 
 Increased efficiency across the business 
 Reduced overtime 
 Shorter lead times 
 New product capability 
 Increased employee motivation 
 Greater accountability and responsibility 
 Beaten budgets in four consecutive years 
 A new culture based on mutual trust & respect 
 A consensus based approach to the management of change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CementCo’s partnership agreement.  In 1997 CementCo signed 
separate employment security agreements with (a) its drivers 
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 (TGWU) and (b) all other staff (GMB, TGWU, AEEU). This step 
was seen as building on previous initiatives that had a focus on 
eroding job demarcations and developing total quality. The 
agreements were largely modelled on those of DrinksCo, both 
management and unions having visited DrinksCo the year before. 
Again there was a preoccupation with the internal conditions for 
partnership. Terms of the agreement were summarised in a note 
from the union side (See Box 2).    
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 Box 2: The basis of the Way Ahead Agreement at CementCo 
Company Benefits 
 Employee involvement to minimise cost 
 Flexible working 
 New technology to be brought in 
 Distribution fleet to be reviewed annually 
 Modest pay increases 
Employee Benefits 
 All staff to be salaried – end to clocking on 
 NVQ based training programme 
 3.5percent pay increase plus £200 for drivers and pay freeze following
year 
 Pay review body for drivers in 1999 
 Drivers working week cut by one hour 
 No contracting out of drivers work for next five years 
 Process production staff to revive RPI plus 0.25percent for three years 
 No compulsory redundancies for production staff gain there was an emphasis on pay moderation, in the form of a 
ng-term’ pay deal and assurances of employment security. An 
sertion of its prerogative to ‘right-size’ was supplemented with 
surances that all redundancies would be voluntary. In a further 
splay of commitment to the core there would be no contracting 
t of drivers’ work for the next five years and if there were cuts 
 staffing, temporary workers would be the first to go. The 
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 agreement signalled that employment security assurances could 
potentially become open ended if there was subsequent 
willingness ‘to settle pay in the interests of job security’.    
 
Like at DrinksCo, there were concerted efforts to depart from 
traditional patterns of hierarchy. Training was considered to be an 
investment with the promise of a large-scale properly funded 
training programme supporting the multi-skilling of all staff; 
business improvement teams; and self directed team working. All 
this was in support of a process of developing a culture of 
continuous improvement. ‘You’ve got to coach not dictate and 
recognise why a host of ideas have gone untapped’. 
 
Senior management stressed that a union was needed in a 
competitive environment in order to have ‘a coherent team’.  
‘The workforce need a voice from somewhere. If there’s 
no union organisation there is no point of reference that 
you can refer to’. 
 
Underpinning this was a commitment to social dialogue. Changes 
in procedural structure included the introduction of Local Action 
Teams that ‘could talk about everything except cement prices, 
acquisitions and general stock market related issues’. As in 
DrinksCo, targeted training to influence the interaction of union 
and management leadership had been introduced but was at an 
earlier stage. Joint training for shop stewards and front-line 
managers was planned. A ‘hotline’ was also set up, staffed by the 
senior shop steward and a senior personnel manager to provide 
individuals with an opportunity to raise grievances and personal 
concerns.  Management felt that the single most important 
motivational factor is communications and, evidently, involvement 
in decision-making:   
‘They are never good enough, though if there is trust you 
don’t need it. You need to explain to people why you want 
them to do something. [You’ll have problems] if you’re not 
open with people and talk to them like adults, involve them 
in decisions’. 
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Employment security agreements that legitimate and 
institutionalise organizational uncertainty. = The distinction 
between economic insecurity and organisational insecurity was 
made in earlier analyses of the JIWIS data which found that 
employer promises to their workforce were conditional on 
economic uncertainty (due to product demand changes and 
technical change) and organisational uncertainty (corporate 
restructuring and merger and take-over activity in pursuit of 
shareholder value) (Burchell et.al. 1994; Wilkinson 2002). This 
was reflected in the dialectic of organisational pursuit of flexibility 
by default and design. (Hudson 2001, in Burchell et. al. 2001).  
 
Both CementCo and DrinksCo had compulsory redundancies prior 
to signing employment security agreements (See table 6). 
However, at the time of interview, neither company felt sure that 
they could sustain their employment security agreements. 
Tellingly, at both DrinksCo and CementCo employment 
assurances did not apply to the context of plant closures. 
CementCo’s agreement noted that employment security would be 
suspended ‘if one of the partners felt that the spirit of the 
agreement had been fundamentally breached or if a site were 
closed’ or if industrial action were undertaken.  Although it could 
be argued that plant closure decisions not genuinely jointly made 
would represent a fundamental breach, senior management at 
CementCo indicated that if there is significant investment in new 
plant a round table discussion about the efficiency of manning the 
redundancies could be conducted. 
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 Table 6: Job security agreements and compulsory 
redundancies across JIWIS partnership and non partnership 
companies  
 
 
Stated policy 
of deliberately 
avoiding CR 
(year 
introduced) 
SMQ.32a 
Perception 
of policy as 
sustainable 
in the next 5 
years 
SMQ.32b 
Redundancy 
Exercises 
involving CR 
in last 5 years 
(year) 
SMQ24 
Nature of 
“redundancies” 
in the last 5 years 
 
 
VR       CR    VER 
CementCo   
Partnership 
Employment 
Security 
Agreement 
(1997) 
 
Unsure 
 
1994 
 
25% 
 
75% 
 
x 
CableCo 
Non 
partnership 
 
Yes 
No (site 
closing 1999 
– linked to 
merger) 
 
1996 
 
Few 
 
Most 
 
x 
DrinksCo 
Partnership 
No Compulsory 
Redundancy 
Agreement 
(1994) 
Not sure 
(uncertainty 
due to recent 
merger) 
 
1993/4 
 
86% 
 
14% 
 
x 
DairyCo 
Non 
partnership 
 
Not sure 
Informally 
would aim to 
avoid CR 
 
none 
 
100%* 
 
x 
 
x 
InsureCo 
Partnership 
A philosophy 
rather than a 
stated policy 
No (due to 
recent 
merger) 
 
none 
 
100 %* 
 
x 
 
x 
BankCo 
Non 
Partnership 
Security of 
Employment 
Agreement 
(revised 1991) 
Would like 
to think so 
(branch 
manager at 
local level) 
 
1997 
 
x 
 
Yes 
 
x 
RegColl 
Partnership 
 
Yes 
Unsure 
(because of 
funding 
pressures) 
 
1996/98 
 
 
Few 
 
Most 
 
 
Most
FEColl 
Non 
partnership 
No (long-
standing policy 
recently 
changed) 
 
x 
 
1998 
 
x 
 
100% 
 
x 
VR - voluntary redundancy;  
CR - compulsory redundancy 
VER - voluntary early retirement 
* staff offered relocation to job in another part of the organisation/country 
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 CementCo had an investment programme for new state of the art 
plants. After having cut its workforce size by 40 percent in 1985 
and  21 percent in 1994, by 1998 it envisaged a further 15 to 18 
percent of the workforce to be lost through the closure of three of 
its ten plants over the next five years. Senior management 
acknowledged a down side to this, an optimal limit to job cutting 
being described as perilously close. In spite of assurances that the 
jobs would go through voluntary severance, at the time of 
fieldwork, workers most likely to be affected were concerned that 
when their plant was shut, they might not be absorbed into the new 
plant. In other words they were questioning the credibility of 
employment security assurances in the face of corporate 
restructuring plans. And in spite of the centrality of re-training to 
the employment security agreement, the company identified a 
problem in getting people to re-train because the workforce 
perceived a pattern of redundancies to follow the training. Taken 
in organisational historical perspective this is perhaps 
unsurprising. 
 
DrinksCo had voluntary redundancies throughout the life of its 
employment security agreement. Following a merger in 1997, it 
had promised that it would follow a £200m per year cost savings 
target (The Guardian, June 20 1998). This arguably fuelled 
uncertainty about the sustainability of employment security 
assurances.  Indeed further plant closures were soon scheduled. 
After our work with DrinksCo in the field it was announced that 
the company would close three of its distilleries. A strong pound 
and the Asian economic crisis may well have fuelled economic 
uncertainty and the closure decision (The Guardian, June 20 
1998), but what of the organisational uncertainty generated by 
further rationalisation plans to meet promises made to 
shareholders?   
 
Both economic uncertainty and organisational uncertainty have 
influenced the credibility of these attempts at pro-active 
partnership, but organisational uncertainty is avoidable. Where 
organisational uncertainty is not avoided, reactive partnership 
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 tendencies seemed to be present, which is what emerged in the 
case of DrinksCo and what workers feared at CementCo. 
 
From proactive to reactive partnership tendencies: InsureCo 
During the period of our study, InsureCo, appeared to experience a 
shift away from pro-active partnership tendencies towards more 
reactive partnership tendencies. It recognised a staff association 
for collective bargaining, covering all but senior managers, and 
reported an enormous improvement in relations with the 
association during the last five years. Earlier relations were 
described as ‘quite beer and sandwiches’, in other words, 
adversarial.   However, the new relationship was imbued with a 
culture of ‘sharing’ that was more ‘productive’ and rational. 
 
InsureCo felt that reliable delivery of services and maintenance of 
low claims costs were important determinants of performance 
effectiveness and competitive success. However, reducing labour 
costs could be a double-edged sword, because a happy, well-paid, 
secure staff were more likely to help the company achieve its aim 
of reducing claims costs. While InsureCo did not have a formal 
employment security agreement it stressed that ‘no compulsory 
redundancies’ was very much the organisational philosophy. In 
terms of the necessary conditions for job security, there seemed to 
be greater emphasis on the imperative of maintaining customers 
than on pay moderation. 
 
During the previous five years, InsureCo had reduced the size of 
its workforce by 10 percent in a programme of substantial de-
layering of managerial grades and elimination of lower value jobs. 
Again we see changes in traditional hierarchies. Operations were 
becoming more team based with greater delegation, empowerment 
and self-controlling teams. 
 
It was implied that the new culture of sharing was about social 
dialogue. According to the director responsible for staff relations, 
the company was 'involved deeply' with the staff association in the 
development of staff roles. Management had consulted the staff 
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 association at all stages of restructuring, voluntary severance and 
other matters arising from the change in working practices.  He 
admitted that the company had failed in the past in its 
communications with staff, but that there was now a great 
awareness of this issue. Many steps had been taken to improve 
matters including the biennial conference attended by members of 
the staff, at which improving communications was a major topic. 
There were also circle groups, focus groups and a structure of 
local consultative committees. The managing director maintained 
that the only way it was possible for an organisation to be truly 
competitive over the long-haul was in persuading the staff that 
they belonged to a first class company that would look after them. 
Implicit was the importance of cultivating goodwill and there was 
a sense that the company had moved away from Tayloristic, low 
trust employment relations, in trying to avoid social uncertainty. 
The company would help develop their career path by expanding 
their skills and allowing them the freedom to make decisions and 
to apply them in the framework of control by their peers, i.e. using 
the team-working principle. 
 
However, eight months after bringing the importance of genuine 
job security to the fore, organisational uncertainty emerged in the 
form of a merger. Compulsory redundancies were felt to be 
inevitable. 
 
Pseudo Partnership:   RegColl 
A move to greater social partnership also occurred in RegColl. 
Whereas under the previous principal, trade unions had had little 
influence at the college, during the past five years, under the 
leadership of a new principal, they had become more influential; 
and formal structures had been put in place to facilitate their 
involvement. The new principal described this as her decision, part 
of the way in which she has provided the college with a new 
direction, trying to encourage self motivation in an environment 
where student achievement and academic quality were seen as 
important in maintaining performance. 
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 Part of this new direction had been greater opportunities for social 
dialogue. A workplace joint consultation committee was used to 
develop targets and performance measures; and to give people an 
opportunity to be involved in decision-making. As well as 
conducting an attitude survey followed up with an action plan, an 
open surgery was started to give people an opportunity to 
approach the principal on a one-to-one basis. However, the 
principal was skeptical of the value of these opportunities for 
social dialogue: 
‘Employees often complain that they want opportunities to 
communicate but, when such opportunities are provided, 
they don’t make the effort to use them’. 
 
RegColl had a no compulsory redundancy agreement but felt 
unsure that it would be able to honour it due to funding pressures. 
Subsequently there were compulsory redundancies, seemingly as 
the brunt of funding pressures were brought to bear on labour. The 
Principal also noted that a significant number of employers had 
been contracted out, including catering and security and part-time 
teaching staff. There was a sense that events were out of her 
control as the college responded to cuts in college funding. It was 
the Principal at RegColl who emphasised that flexibility required a 
higher degree of flexibility and mutual trust. And she further noted 
that ‘employees have got a worse deal….. flexibility for 
employees means infringement of basic rights’. 
 
The content of dialogue strains human relations: FEColl 
FEColl emphasised that the motivation, commitment and 
development of staff was crucial to performance, though it was 
reported that other senior managers placed more emphasis on price 
considerations. It was a difficult time for the organisation, a time 
of uncertainty and change. Catering had been contracted out and 
brought back in because of complaints about the service. Excess 
supply in course provision had led to merger discussions amongst 
providers. The long standing policy on avoiding compulsory 
redundancies had been ended with the compulsory redundancies of 
part-time lecturers. This was another instance of labour costs 
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 bearing the brunt of the organizational response to increased 
pressures. 
 
Social dialogue was in action. Open forums had been introduced to 
address blocks in communication. And there was regular contact 
between management and recognised trade unions through a joint 
consultation committee. However, the content of dialogue with the 
trade unions had become more difficult. A senior manager 
described how she had to negotiate in circumstances that she could 
not control. An expression of the deterioration in relations was a 
partial one day strike held over a distributive issue, a 33 percent 
pay cut for part-time teachers, their hourly rate having been cut 
from £22 to £15 per hour. Social dialogue may have been in 
action, but it was also under strain. 
 
The senior manager dwelt on the importance of both written and 
unwritten contracts in securing flexible working practices and 
motivating employees, noting that the goodwill of employees was 
essential.  However, she reported that the psychological contract 
was being undermined. Discussing declining morale, she noted 
that there had been ‘a loss of goodwill’.  
 
In practice, there was not a great deal of difference in the 
circumstances of RegColl and FEColl. Perhaps the pseudo 
partnership of RegColl reflected the content of its dialogue with 
the workforce and trade unions becoming more difficult. More 
than the opportunity to talk and exchange information can be 
needed to enhance the conditions for goodwill, especially when 
people don’t like what they are hearing and feel powerless to 
maintain or secure what they see as legitimate gains. 
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 Non partnership tendencies and derecognition: BankCo 
In maintaining performance BankCo emphasised the importance 
of customer service and a well-trained staff, using the latest 
technology and controlling labour costs as important. BankCo also 
had an employment security agreement, which though very 
detailed was more narrowly concerned with procedures for 
redundancy, retraining and redeployment than the partnership 
agreements of CementCo and DrinksCo. The agreement stated that 
it was BankCo’s policy  
..’to seek to provide security of employment for every 
member of its staff, having due regard to the need for 
increased efficiency.    Such security of employment is best 
provided by careful planning in the adoption and 
development of new or revised business practices and /or 
procedures including those associated with new technology. 
In accordance with this principal …. The parties agree that 
they share a common aim of maintaining the efficiency and 
profitability of the Bank and in continuing to further the best 
possible relationships in order to safeguard the current or 
future employment of the staff of the Bank’. 
 
Work reorganisation and redundancies featured prominantly in this 
case. A broadening of job content had occurred with a focus on 
customer care; there had been a shift to team working and a 
delayering of the managerial workforce accompanied by the 
devolution of responsibilities to the branch offices. Redundancies 
had occurred in each of the last five years, workforce size falling 
by 17 percent, 30 percent compulsory. In practice then, BankCo’s 
employment security agreement also appeared to legitimise and 
institutionalize organizational uncertainty. 
 
While BankCo was relatively positive about its local relations with 
the Banking Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU), the recognised 
union, it had been experiencing difficulty in introducing new 
contracts in pursuit of a flexible workforce. The problem was felt 
to lay with local branch managers, the very managers who were 
seen as the key to motivation.    
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For managerial staff, BankCo had made substantial efforts to 
change its relationship with BIFU. And it was with regard to this 
that senior management felt that its relationship with BIFU had 
deteriorated on a national level. The union had been derecognised 
for management staff.  This was indicative of such moves by a 
range of organizations in the 1990s. The union was seen as 
‘picking up on any case’, as ‘mischievous’, and the bank ‘had 
enough’. 
 
There were continued opportunities for social dialogue with an 
emphasis on consultation through workplace joint consultation 
committees and a staff forum. The staffing review committee was 
established under the 1991 employment security agreement and 
was the procedural structure within which the union was given 
information and consulted over the implications of work 
restructuring plans, revised business practices, and changed 
trading and economic circumstances. It was noted that ‘when no 
agreement is found the bank goes ahead with its plans anyway’, a 
stance reminiscent of CableCo. 
 
Strong non partnership tendencies: DairyCo and CableCo 
The strongest tendencies to non partnership in our eight cases were 
to be found in DairyCo and CableCo. A concern with cutting 
costs, distributive conflict and recourse to industrial action, poor 
relations between union and management and disillusionment with 
social dialogue were dominant features of these cases. There was 
no evidence of any attempts to move down the road of a 
partnership agreement; so what emerges is a very limited 
adherence to the underlying principles of partnership as espoused 
by the TUC. 
 
At DairyCo, management and unions continued to have a difficult 
relationship. A senior manager expressed a desire for ‘a more 
consultative approach, more recognition of the conditions we find 
ourselves in’. He was asking for more cooperation in a context in 
which he felt that the union was responding to increased pressures 
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 by ‘digging trenches’. Joint consultation structures had been 
longstanding, but were disbanded and then made ad hoc in 1995. 
 
Quality and delivery of performance were important to DairyCo. 
Efforts were being made to deliver a multi-skilled workforce, 
though measures stopped short of self-managing work teams. With 
some prompting it emerged that cutting labour costs was a major 
concern. Management were not clear on whether there was a 
deliberate policy of avoiding compulsory redundancies, though 
expressing an informal desire to secure jobs. There had been one 
redundancy exercise in the last five years in the form of a plant 
closure and the redundancies were labeled as voluntary since 
workers were given the opportunity to relocate to another part of 
the country. 
 
While DairyCo had not experienced a great deal of industrial 
action in recent years, there had been a recent unofficial overtime 
ban. Ironically, there was subsequently a threat of further 
industrial action over loss of overtime, which meant that the JIWIS 
research team was unable to interview employees.  At the heart of 
this tension was a distributive conflict. While CementCo and 
DrinksCo had tried to rule out the deployment of temporary 
workers as a contentious issue by signaling their commitment to 
‘core’ worker security in their partnership agreements, DairyCo 
planned to recruit  temporary workers into permanent post with a 
view to cutting overtime costs, which would erode earnings on the 
job floor. In this context a deterioration of morale was reported. 
 
Similar themes emerged in CableCo. Although trade unions 
continued to be recognised in the negotiation of terms and 
conditions, management felt that the unions had become less 
effective. A senior manager noted: ‘We decide what we want to do 
and do it. Their ability to provide a representative voice has 
fallen’. And blame was apportioned to the quality of the convenor. 
Distributive bargaining appeared dominant and the unions unable 
to secure gains for their members. CableCo had recently 
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 experienced a strike and overtime bans over pay. And neither form 
of action had led to management offering anymore money. 
 
It looked as though CableCo had given up on the procedural 
structures for social dialogue. The senior management was quite 
candid in describing how consultation structures were only 
nominally in place because of European requirements. In practice 
there were no structures for consulting the workforce. They had 
fallen into disrepute since 1990. Nevertheless, it was also reported 
that the unions were consulted on rationalisation plans, including 
redundancy. 
 
Cost reduction was seen as fundamental to performance. 
Delayering of management and a move to team working and 
multi-skilling had taken place. While teams were not self-
managing, delayering had been accompanied by the delegation of 
some decisions to working team leaders. Material costs were 
reported to be more important than labour costs and the extent of 
job cutting reflected CableCo’s greater control over these costs, 
taking us back to price minus costing. There had been substantial 
compulsory redundancies in the last five years. Soon after 
fieldwork was completed in this case, a period of organizational 
uncertainty culminated in the announcement that this work site 
would be closed; an action linked to a merger. 
 
 
3. Patterns of Change in Relations with Employees in 
Partnership versus Non-partnership organisations 
In response to mounting pressures, firms have tended to move 
away from the traditional organisation of work, characterised by a 
strict and hierarchical division between managerial and non-
managerial functions (conceptual, planning, co-ordination and 
distribution) and a fine vertical division of tasks at the production 
level8. With competitiveness increasingly requiring higher quality, 
better design and more frequent changes in products, senior 
managers were demanding greater involvement and co-operation 
from workers; co-operation that could be threatened by attempts to 
 35 
 reduce the terms and conditions of employment. As a result, the 
emphasis has been on improvement in the terms and conditions of 
employment, a key feature of which is the promise of greater 
employment security. In exchange, workers have accepted a 
widening in  the range of tasks they perform, an augmentation in 
their skill levels, and an increase in their involvement by agreeing 
to greater responsibility for quality control, co-ordination and 
management.   
 
In the analysis of the JIWIS these developments have been most 
closely associated with our partnership organisations, though not 
exclusively so. However, the ability of employers to achieve these 
objectives depends on whether they keep their side of the 
‘psychological contract’ and minimise social uncertainty. For 
example, improvement in job content is likely to have a positive 
effect on the psychological contract, thereby increasing the 
individual’s morale and motivation levels. However, if workers 
perceive changes in job content to be a device by which the firm 
reduces employment and intensifies the work of those remaining, 
it would be likely to have a negative impact on the psychological 
contract. 
 
In this section, we draw on employee perceptions to compare 
partnership with non-partnership organisations with respect to 
changes in work organisation and employment relations. These 
include the following: the determinants of work effort and levels 
of motivation; employer commitment to employees, employment 
relations and good HRM practice, increased demands on workers 
and employment security, job satisfaction and employer 
attachment and relative power/union representation. The analysis 
below summarises important differences in the conditions for 
partnership, partnership orientations and employee responses. 
 
As we saw in section 2, although partnership and non-partnership 
organisations were under increasing competitive pressure, 
partnership firms had relatively greater control in both their 
product markets and in relationships with suppliers. Still, in both 
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 cases, employees were expected to shoulder an increasing part of 
the burden of adjusting production to demand. Extra work pressure 
came in the form of increased skills, augmented responsibility, 
broader task composition and increased effort; and unreasonable 
demands were made on hours of work and task requirements. An 
important cause of this pressure came from the inadequacy in 
staffing which was reported by a majority of workers interviewed. 
Although enhancement in job content would seem to require that 
top priority be given to training, fewer than 50 percent of 
respondents reported an increase in training; and a similar 
proportion thought that the training they received was adequate. 
This is despite recognition by workers of the importance of 
training for both their present job and their future career and their 
keenness to acquire it. Only a minority of workers told us that their 
employers were willing to help them get the training they thought 
they needed. In general, communication with immediate 
supervisors was regarded as good, although communication within 
the wider organisation was not as good. Although seen to be 
improving, 25 percent of employees reported that they did not hear 
from managers about changes affecting their work and a half said 
that very often it was by rumour that they first learned of such 
changes. 
 
For the large majority of the workers we interviewed, what 
determined the level of effort they were willing to put into their 
work was not so much pressure from employers and their use of 
reports, appraisals and pay incentives as it was satisfying the needs 
of customers and clients, their fellow workers, using their own 
discretion, feeling that work was useful, and having achievements 
recognised by others. Moreover, reported levels of motivation 
were generally high, indicating employee attachment to their 
current employment. These workers’ attributes are not only a pre-
condition for employee responsiveness to intensified work 
pressure; they are also essential for effective co-operation and for 
partnership at work.  Such attributes were found to be equally 
important in both partnership and non-partnership organisations. 
However, the improvement in job security and promotion 
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 prospects experienced by workers in our study was not 
commensurate with the extra effort they were expected to put 
forth.  Very few felt that their jobs had improved in these respects; 
and although the proportions were higher in partnership than in 
non-partnership organisations, they were nevertheless small.  
 
It is perhaps not surprising that most workers were attached to 
their employers. For the vast majority, job security was important, 
especially as most indicated that it would be difficult to find 
another job as good as their present one. Nevertheless, fewer than 
half in both types of organisation felt secure with their present 
employer and for a similar proportion, the level of security had 
declined over the previous year. Within the organisation, prospects 
for promotion were remote. Reflecting this sense of insecurity, 
only around a third of the workers we interviewed indicated 
certainty about their career, job security, not being laid off, or 
opportunities for promotion.  
 
As it turned out, there were fewer differences in the attitudes and 
responses of workers in partnership and non-partnership firms than 
might have been expected. Employees in partnership organisations 
were more likely than those in non-partnership firms to indicate 
that their present job was the best job they had ever had; they were 
also more attached to their present employers. Non-partnership 
firms were less likely to have redundancy avoidance programmes 
and employees in those firms felt that their employers were more 
likely to use redundancy as a first when problems arose. Worker 
involvement was more widely reported in partnership than in non-
partnership organisations. Relatively fewer employees in 
partnership firms described their management as bureaucratic and 
more agreed that emphasis was placed on employee involvement 
and individual initiative in their workplaces. However, there was 
not a statistically significant difference across partnership versus 
non-partnership organisations in the proportion of workers who 
believed their employers emphasised morale or were loyal to 
them.  
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 A higher proportion of workers in partnership organisations 
reported increases in training, although the figure was little more 
than 50 percent. However, more workers in partnership firms said 
that staffing was inadequate and that unreasonable demands were 
made on the tasks they were expected to perform. In the area of 
pay, partnership organisations scored better than non-partnership 
firms. Workers in partnership organisations were much more 
likely to indicate that their pay compared favourably with similar 
workers in the vicinity, and that it had kept up with the cost of 
living, their needs and the pay of friends and acquaintances. 
Employees in partnership organisations were more also likely to 
believe that their employers made every effort to encourage 
employee commitment and to look after their well-being, but even 
so this only amounted to a third of the employees concerned.  
 
In general, satisfaction with jobs and relationships with managers 
was high; but satisfaction with pay, job security and prospects for 
promotion was low. Levels of employee morale were generally 
low and falling. Scepticism about employers’ concern for 
employee welfare at work and lack of trust in management was 
wide spread. Few workers felt that they that they were very fairly 
treated and only 30 percent agreed that workers and bosses were 
on the same side. Employees were not generally trusting of 
managers to look after their best interests or to keep them 
informed about matters affecting their future. Few felt that they 
understood their employers well enough to exercise any influence. 
It is therefore not surprising that the vast majority of employees 
were members of trade unions and that they believed the 
importance of trade union membership had increased. 
 
4. Conclusions  
It has been rightly argued that in recent years there has been less 
opportunity for distributive bargaining and more opportunity for 
integrative bargaining to facilitate co-operation between 
management and trade unions and competitive success (Brown 
et.al., 2001:189). Nevertheless, firms have responded to growing 
product and capital market pressures by passing on costs to 
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 suppliers, sub-contracting, cutting jobs and increasing the use of 
temporary and casual workers. But the main burden of securing 
higher performance at lower costs has fallen on the core work 
force. This has been driven by the changing market demands and 
the additional burdens imposed on the survivors by downsizing 
and the delayering of management. Workers are required to be 
more responsive, responsible and co-operative, to acquire greater 
skills, intensify effort and accept greater responsibilities, and 
generally become more flexible. But, while employees have 
generally welcomed opportunities to take more control over the 
planning and execution of their work, distrust of management is 
widespread and the perception is that pay levels have failed to 
adequately compensate for the extra responsibility, accountability, 
work-load, working hours and effort that workers are expected to 
bear. As we have just seen in our exploration of human resource 
practices in organisations tending to and away from partnership, 
there is much commonality in the experience of employees. 
 
What has been happening is that largely unconditional demands 
are being made of workers whilst employers’ commitment to job 
security, and to honouring other promises made to their 
employees, are increasingly conditional on the ambitions of top 
management and the pressure imposed on them by product market 
pressure and the stock market. The unconditional demands made 
by management require workers to be totally committed to 
organisational objectives and to collectivise their effort, while the 
conditional promises made by managers mean that workers are 
readily disposable and that risk is individualised. In Wood’s words 
(2000), there is no evidence that workers have failed ‘to develop 
themselves in order to accept fresh responsibilities.’ Rather, there 
is evidence that employers, or more precisely the employing 
system, ‘has not taken the responsibility for providing the context 
in which this can happen’. 
 
Sandwiched between the demands of customers and shareholders, 
the new forms of work organisation have thus become new forms 
of exploitation, made more sophisticated by worker involvement 
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 in the process. But as with more traditional forms of exploitation, 
the new forms are counter-productive. Increased work 
intensification and employment uncertainty have served to lower 
trust, reduce morale and motivation and turn stress into a major 
industrial disease. Not surprisingly, the greater involvement of 
workers has not diminished their sense of need for trade union 
protection, or the importance of representation, independent of 
management, in their working lives (Burchell, et al. 2001). 
 
The essence of work systems is that employers and workers have 
shared and separate interests. Both have a stake in total value 
added,9 which is generated by their cooperation in production; but 
each claims a share which limits what the others can have. The 
claim to a share that either side makes is likely to be tempered by 
the necessity of ensuring that the other side continues to 
effectively cooperate. The important point here is that in 
production, each party must to take into account two different 
types of incentives: 1) their own and 2) that needed to get their 
partner(s) into full co-operation with them.  
 
But the sequence of events is that the decision to co-operate is 
taken prior to the realisation of the benefits from co-operation.  In 
effect, in deciding the extent of their co-operation, individuals give 
a hostage to fortune, the outcome of which depends on how their 
partners respond. The choice being made is therefore between 
short and long term interest, whether to take a larger slice now and 
risk a smaller pie later. And that choice is necessarily based on the 
predictions about what others will do which depend on the 
promises they make and whether they can be trusted to keep them.   
 
Employees we interviewed were motivated to work hard to meet 
the requirements of a wide range of stakeholders, to expand the 
content of their jobs to meet these objectives and to acquire the 
necessary training. They were satisfied with their jobs and their 
relationships with management but not with their pay, job security 
or prospects for promotion. Many thought that while management 
made efforts to involve them, they also made unreasonable 
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 demands, failed to provide adequate training and support for 
training, failed to fully communicate and provide effective 
support. Management was also not to be trusted far. From the 
worker’s perspective, therefore, what partnership there might have 
been was one sided. Interestingly, as we saw in section 2, 
organisations tending towards partnership were not only coming 
under less pressure from their customers, but were also most able 
to pass pressure onto their suppliers. In these organisations, 
management has gone further to meet the worker’s side of the 
psychological contract than in those tending away from 
partnership. However, there is more shadow than substance to 
their commitment to partnership.  
 
There are few indications that workers are convinced that their 
organisations are unitary and can be depended upon to even-
handedly pursue the interests of all stakeholders. Rather, there are 
indications that employees believe that managers are unwilling to 
match workers’ commitments with commitments of their own.  
Employees have interests that are different from those of 
management, the pursuit of which requires independent 
representation. This is not to say, however, that the interests 
workers see themselves as having are necessarily opposed to those 
of the organisations they serve. 
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  Notes 
 
1. For a discussion of the concept of productive systems see 
Wilkinson (1983), Tarling and Wilkinson (1987), 
Konzelmann Smith (1996), Birecree and Konzelmann (1997) 
and Birecree, Konzelmann and Wilkinson (1997), 
Konzelmann and Forrant (2001). 
 
2. Externatilities are costs not fully accounted for in the price or 
market system. 
 
3. Appelbaum and Batt (1994) in their extremely valuable study 
identified four main systems of cooperation production:  
Italian flexible specialisation; German diversified quality 
production; and Swedish sociotechnical systems. The 
Japanese and Swedish systems are more firmly rooted in 
Taylorist mass production than the German or, particularly, 
the Italian. But what the four systems have in common is the 
importance given to high levels of worker training and the 
success they have achieved in closely involving workers at 
all levels of the organisation in the management of 
production, in product and process innovation and in the 
development of organisations and institutions designed to 
facilitate cooperative working relationships. 
 
4. See Fox (1974) for a further discussion. 
 
5. Foreword to the White Paper, Fairness at Work Cm 3968 
(1998), at p. 3. 
 
6. www.tuc.org.uk/partnership/six_principles.cfm 
 
7. Taylor differentiated between the conceptualisation of work 
(how it is organised) and the execution of work (how it is 
carried out). and insisted that management had prerogative 
over the former.  He also applied the principle of the division 
of labour to the execution of work by separating out and 
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 simplifying the required tasks. The responsibility for co-
ordinating the individualised tasks then fell to management.  
Taylor also believed that the incentives regulating the task 
performance were essentially pecuniary, the determinants of 
which also fell to management. 
 
8. Which can be taken to include material and socio-physic 
elements.  
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1 For a discussion of the concept of productive systems see Wilkinson (1983), Tarling and Wilkinson 
(1987), Konzelmann Smith (1996), Birecree and Konzelmann (1997) and Birecree, Konzelmann and 
Wilkinson (1997), Konzelmann and Forrant (2000). 
2 Externatilities are costs not fully accounted for in the price or market system. 
3 Appelbaum and Batt (1994) in their extremely valuable study identified four main systems of cooperation 
production:  Italian flexible specialisation; German diversified quality production; and Swedish 
sociotechnical systems.  The Japanese and Swedish systems are more firmly rooted in Taylorist mass 
production than the German or, particularly, the Italian.  But what the four systems have in common is the 
importance given to high levels of worker training and the success they have achieved in closely involving 
workers at all levels of the organisation in the management of production, in product and process 
innovation and in the development of organisations and institutions designed to facilitate cooperative 
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4 See Fox (1974) for a further discussion. 
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8 Taylor differentiated between the conceptualisation of work (how it is organised) and the execution of 
work (how it is carried out). and insisted that management had prerogative over the former.  He also 
applied the principle of the division of labour to the execution of work by separating out and simplifying 
the required tasks.  The responsibility for co-ordinating the individualised tasks then fell to management.  
Taylor also believed that the incentives regulating the task performance were essentially pecuniary, the 
determinants of which also fell to management. 
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